Consumers, Food, Trust and Safety. The need for collaboration between the social and natural sciences by Frewer, L.J.
 1
  
 
 Consumers, Food, Trust and Safety 
The Need for Collaboration Between the Social and Natural Sciences  
Oratie  Mevr Professor Dr Lynn Frewer, donderdag 27 mei 2004 
 
“De mens lijdt het meest van het lijden dat hij vreest” 
“People suffer most from the suffering of which they are afraid”  
Vader Cats 
 
1. Introduction 
Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, hooggeleerde collegae, zeer gewaardeerde toehoorders. With your 
permission, I will change to English, as I think this will be easier for all of us!  
My lecture today will focus on how consumers perceive different food risks, and how this relates to 
their trust in the various actors in the food chain (including regulatory institutions and scientists 
involved in food production, as well as the food industry and producers). I will discuss what this 
means in terms of how food safety is both communicated and regulated.  I will examine some 
emerging food issues, and discuss how an integrated approach between the social and natural 
sciences is the best way to address issues in the food safety area. Finally, I will illustrate the 
effectiveness of this approach through examples of ongoing and developing research initiatives in 
WUR. 
Inleiding 
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Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, hooggeleerde collegae, zeer gewaardeerde toehoorders. Met uw 
toestemming zou ik graag overgaan op het Engels, aangezien ik denk dat dit voor ons allemaal 
eenvoudiger zal zijn!  
Mijn lezing vandaag, zal zich richten op de wijze waarop consumenten verschillende voedselrisico’s 
waarnemen, en hoe dit zich verhoudt tot hun vertrouwen in verschillende actoren in de voedselketen 
(inclusief regelgevende instanties en wetenschappers betrokken bij de voedselproductie, alsook de 
voedselindustrie en producenten). Ik zal bespreken wat dit betekent in termen van de communicatie 
en regelgeving met betrekking tot voedselveiligheid.  Ik zal enige voedsel gerelateerde kwesties die 
op dit moment in opkomst zijn onderzoeken, en bespreken waarom een geïntegreerde aanpak tussen 
sociale en natuur wetenschappen de beste manier is om de kwesties in het gebied van 
voedselveiligheid te behandelen. Tenslotte zal ik de effectiviteit van deze aanpak illustreren door 
middel van voorbeelden van  lopend onderzoek en onderzoeksplannen  
 
2. Public perceptions of risk and safety?  
As a starting point, it is useful to consider how consumer risk perceptions may differ from those of other 
stakeholders involved in food production.  It has been well established that people’s risk perceptions 
determine how they react to different hazards. Some factors (for example, whether a hazard is voluntary 
in terms of exposure or technological in origin) predict people’s responses across different hazard 
domains. Other factors are domain specific (for example, people may have concerns about the potential 
for negative effects on animal welfare in the case of BSE, or Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, which 
will not apply to other types of potential hazard). It is important to address people’s perceptions in the 
process of risk management and communication, otherwise the activities of risk managers and assessors 
are likely to be considered as detached from the concerns and fears of both citizens and consumers. As a 
consequence, the public may distrust the motives of those responsible for assessing or managing risk. 
 
It has been long established that people’s responses to different risks are socially constructed. In other 
words it is psychological factors that are important in influencing people’s responses to a particular 
hazard. The technical risk estimates traditionally provided by experts do not influence people’s 
behaviours and responses. People’s risk perceptions are a far more influential determinant of their 
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responses to different risks. For example, a risk that people perceive to be involuntary in terms of their 
personal exposure is more threatening than one that they choose to take, even if the probability of harm 
is the same, or possibly even less. For similar reasons, naturally occurring risks are less threatening than 
hazards that are technological in origin. People fear potentially catastrophic hazards [such as nuclear 
disasters] more than [for example car accidents] that affect a similar number of people, but at different 
times and places. Natural risks (for example, being struck by lightening) are less frightening than 
technological risks (for example, the toxic effects of pesticide residues; see Katsuya 2001 for examples 
from the nuclear area; Slovic, 1993 for examples contrasting technological and natural risk). Other 
concerns are very specific to particular hazard domains, and this is very much the case in relation to food  
(for example, see Miles and Frewer, 2001).  
 
The fact that public risk perceptions are constructed differently to the technical risk estimates, which are 
usually presented in risk communication by expert communities, has been the reason why public 
concerns have often been dismissed on the basis of “irrationality”. As a consequence, they have tended 
to be excluded from policy processes by risk assessors and managers. However, it is these public 
concerns (and people’s associated behaviours, for example related to food choices) that have direct 
consequences for human health, food safety and security, economic expansion and international 
regulation.   
 
Public risk perceptions have been shown to be particularly important determinants of public responses to 
activities in the agri-food area. These include, food safety (Fife-Schaw and Rowe, 2000; Verbeke, 2001; 
Frewer and Salter, 2002), the biosciences, (Frewer et al, 1997), and possible unintended negative 
environmental and health impacts of technology (Levidow and Marris 2001). Risk information that does 
not address all the concerns of the people to whom it is directed, and which does not take account of the 
social context in which the information is embedded, may be discounted by individuals receiving that 
information. 
 
2. Public or publics? 
Individual differences in risk perceptions are important, particularly under circumstances where risk 
exposure is perceived to be involuntary (Barnett and Breakwell, 2001). Affective or emotional factors, 
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such as “worry’’, may also influence perceived risk (Baron et al, 2000), as may personality correlates such 
as “anxiety” (Bouyer et al, 2001). Differences in perceptions of risk and benefit associated with various 
hazards exist between different countries and cultures, between different individuals, and even within 
different individuals at different times and within different contexts (Burger et al, 2001). For example, 
being male or female is one of the best predictors of higher risk perception for a range of health and 
safety issues, with women typically reporting higher risk perceptions than men (Dosman et al 2001).  
 
Differential exposure of disadvantaged groups, particularly where they are not the recipients of obvious 
benefits (for example, children or people in developing countries) may result in a risk being evaluated 
more negatively than if this was not the case. For the risks of a technology to be acceptable to the public, 
the benefits from a technology must be perceived to accrue to people exposed to the risks, or to the 
environment, (Frewer, 1999) and not only to industry or producers. National and international differences 
in risk perceptions must be identified and incorporated into the process of risk management if the 
development and application of regulatory frameworks is to be harmonised in a world where trade and 
communication is increasingly global (Frewer et al, in press).  
 
3. Food Safety and Risk Analysis  
Traditional models of risk analysis have assumed that risk communication follows on from risk 
management, which, in turn, is the outcome of risk assessment. More recent frameworks have 
assumed some level of integration between these three elements of risk analysis (for example, FAO / 
WHO, 1998), in part a response to the decline in public trust in risk analysis practices. For any kind of 
integration between the different parts of risk analysis it is essential that consumers trust the involved 
risk communicators, managers and assessors. At the present time, there is still concern about the 
continuing decline in public trust in the activities of those involved in the process of risk analysis. 
 
Much public negativity associated with the way risks are managed and regulated has been the result of 
risk managers, assessors and other key actors in the process of risk analysis failing to take account of the 
actual concerns of the public when assessing, managing, and communicating about risks. An illustrative 
example is found in the area of food safety, which has been the focus of much public controversy in 
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recent years.  One consequence has been increased public distrust in the motives of regulators, science 
and industry in taking decisions or actions in relation to risk assessment priorities, resource allocation and 
risk mitigation activities (Frewer, 1999).  Jensen and Sandøe (2002) have observed that, despite the 
creation of new food safety institutions such as the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the decline 
in public confidence in food safety continues. This may, it is argued, be partly the result of communication 
about food safety issues being based on scientific risk assessments alone, and failing to incorporate 
public concerns, values and fears into a broader societal debate (Levidow and Marris, 2002). 
Communication that does not explicitly address public concerns is likely to have a limited role in 
reassuring the public (Frewer et al, in press).  
 
Jensen and Sandøe argue that this is because risk assessment is presented to the public by interested 
institutions as a purely objective scientific event located in the natural world, which is not influenced by 
societal values or subjective judgements.  For this reason, risk assessment has been frequently assumed 
to be “functionally separate” from the other components of risk analysis, risk management and 
communication. In contrast, risk management is typically described as political in orientation. Risk 
communication is the process by which the results of both risk management and risk assessment are 
communicated to the general public and, thus prone to influence by risk experts who may be, as a 
consequence, perceived by the public to be promoting their own agendas.  
Other values and preferences may be bought to bear on the risk assessment – for example, how to 
handle probability and variability, which assessment methods to select under which circumstances, when 
to adopt novel assessment processes, and at what point in time to assess risks. In addition, it is also 
important to communicate risk probability to all interested stakeholders, and risk variability to those most 
at risk (Thompson and Bloom, 2000). The values of assessors and managers may influence how, when 
and if this information is provided to risk communicators and the general public. Values may also be 
bought to bear in the determination of how resources are allocated in the identification of emerging 
hazards, and the conditions under which new assessment and risk mitigation approaches are adopted. 
Therefore the argument that risk assessment is an objective science and is value free cannot be 
automatically supported. It is therefore important to acknowledge the potential influence of values 
throughout the risk analysis framework.  
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5. The development of current risk analysis practices 
The finding that lay people incorporate psychological factors into their personal assessment of the 
acceptability of risk was of great interest to the risk assessment management community. These findings 
appeared to explain why risk management decisions acceptable to expert communities (for example, 
regulators and scientists) were not acceptable to the general public, or at least sub-groups within the 
population.  
 
Consequently, risk communication activities in the 1970s focused on changing public views on risk, with 
emphasis on communication directed towards risk acceptance, particularly in the area of acceptance of 
emerging technologies. The process of attempting to align public views with the risk analysis community 
has been described by Hilgartner (1990) as the “deficit model”, whereby expert and elite organisations 
and institutions assumed that the publics are in some way deficient in their understanding of risk. If the lay 
public could understand science and its applications, technology, then concerns about the way 
associated risks were assessed and managed would disappear. In other words, communicators adopted 
the perspective that the public was ignorant of the scientific “truth” about risk. For this reason, the goal of 
risk communication was to “rectify the knowledge gap” between the originators of scientific information 
and those receiving the information. As a consequence, when the gap is rectified public acceptance of 
technology implementation and commercialisation would be automatic. Despite the best efforts of the 
popularisers of science and technology, the lay public remained deeply sceptical of the motives of 
scientists, regulators and industrialists (Bauer 1995).  
 
The next stage was to consider public trust in regulatory institutions and industry. It was reasoned that the 
acceptance of emerging technologies and other hazards was contingent on public trust in institutions with 
responsibility for regulating the associated risks. For example, Siegrist (1999) has reported that, for 
citizens with high levels of trust in institutions with responsibility for regulating gene technology and its 
products, perceived risk in the technology is decreased and perceived benefit resulting from it is 
increased. Citizen distrust in these same institutions has the converse effect on perceptions of risk and 
benefit.  
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 Although public trust appears to be essential for risk communication, whether it is trust driving risk 
perceptions, or risk perceptions driving trust, is a question that remains to be answered. However, 
restoring trust in regulatory institutions, scientific processes, and industry appeared, to many institutional 
actors to be the way to take risk analysis practice forward. It was argued that, if the public trusted the 
institutional actors with responsibility for consumer protection, then the public would also place high levels 
of trust in those individuals. It was assumed that an increase in trust could be achieved by a greater 
emphasis on increased transparency in the process of risk analysis, in particularly risk assessment and 
risk management. There is some limited evidence to suggest increased transparency is a pre-condition 
for trust in institutional activities to develop, although transparency in itself is not a trust increasing event 
(Frewer et al, 1996).  Lack of transparency may result in increased distrust, but trust per se is a result of 
citizen perceptions of institutional honesty, concern for public welfare, and competence.   Thus it is 
unlikely that increased transparency in risk analysis itself will increase public trust, but reducing 
transparency will increase public distrust.  
 
A second approach to developing trust focused on greater public inclusion in the process of policy 
development. When people feel a lack of control over their exposure to potential hazards, risks are 
perceived as higher, so in cases where there is a lack of control, trust in risk assessment and risk 
management is likely to be a particularly important determinant of public confidence in food safety.  A 
case in point is that of genetically modified foods, where consumer concern did not focus primarily on risk 
per se, but rather on the lack of personal control on the part of the consumer over consumption (Miles 
and Frewer, 2001). It was reasoned by the policy community that more extensive public consultation and 
participation in risk management and other science and technology issues would restore public 
confidence in institutions with responsibility for public and consumer protection (see, for example, Renn, 
Webler and Wiederman, 1995; Rowe, Marsh and Frewer, 2004).  This was an institutional response to 
the exclusion of consumers and / or citizens from the decision-making processes associated with risk 
analysis. This reflected institutional recognition that citizen’s attitudes towards different hazards are not 
only dependent on an analytical assessment of risk and benefit. Other factors, such as ethical and moral 
considerations, were recognised as potentially influential in establishing the acceptability or otherwise of a 
particular hazard or societal approval of the measures put into place to contain specific risks.  
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One result of this institutional concern about public distrust in their activities was increased emphasis on 
the “functional separation” between risk assessment and risk management. Risk assessment was, as 
before, implicitly assumed to exist in the “natural world”, and thus portrayed as immune from influence 
from social values and societal priorities. Political influences and societal concerns were also assumed by 
decision-makers to be confined to risk management through the process of functional separation of the 
three components of the risk analysis framework. Risk communication was, arguably, promoted as a tool 
to reinforce the principal of institutional transparency rather than a mechanism for developing a direct 
dialogue with citizens and / or consumers.   
 
In fact, the functional separation of the three components, and isolation of risk as an immutable truth, 
would naturally follow on from the assumption that science was isolated from the influence of society and 
its predominant values. The ways in which science and the social world are often viewed as independent 
of each other has been the focus of systematic study. For example, Woolgar (1996) has noted that it is 
useful to examine what underlines the received view regarding the assumptions of scientific “neutrality” 
and its portrayal. The first assumption relates to how objects in the natural world are “objective” and “real”, 
and have an existence independent of human beings. The actions and beliefs of human beings are 
incidental to nature (and these must be isolated from scientific “truth” in order to maintain its purity). From 
this, scientific knowledge (for example, risk assessment) can only be determined by understanding those 
objective realities found and observed in the natural world. As a consequence, investigation of scientific 
knowledge is via a unitary set of methods, the application of which is the result of consensus agreement 
by scientific experts and elite bodies. Finally, science is an activity, which is individualistic (rather than 
amenable to collectivist or consensus approaches to decision-making), and “cognitive” or ”logical” rather 
than “subjective” or “affective”. Risk assessment, it is assumed, is founded entirely in the “objective” 
reality provided by science, and must be portrayed as immune form values, preferences or investigation 
by different methodological variants. In contrast, risk management is assumed to be prone to influence by 
political judgements. The question of societal trust in risk assessment is therefore not open to question.   
Public trust can only vary in risk management, where value judgements can influence how decisions are 
made.  As a consequence, it follows on that it therefore becomes necessary to separate risk assessment 
from risk management in order to gain public trust in the risk analysis process This assumption does not 
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take account of the potential influence of values on risk assessment, which will become increasingly 
obvious with increased transparency.  
 
6. Some additional effects of increased transparency in risk analysis 
In controversial fields such as nuclear science and biotechnology, public trust may be taken as a 
statement about the legitimacy of the activities that are encompassed by technological development and 
subsequent commercialisation of technology applications.  One measure of the success of any 
technology innovation is the degree of public trust in analytical and regulatory procedures associated with 
the technology.  If public confidence in a particular arena declines, there will be a negative impact in 
terms of the political exposure of the regulatory institutions, the economic vulnerability of the industrial 
sector concerned and the likely amplification of critical media interest in the sector overall. Scientific and 
regulatory authority has lost much of the credibility conferred upon it in the past. In other words, people no 
longer trust science to legitimise itself by reference to the technical estimates about risk which science 
itself produces (Frewer and Salter, in press).  
 
Frewer and Salter (2002) have observed that public distrust in risk analysis (and by implication risk 
assessment, management and communication) may be attributable to various changes in society. This 
may be partly the result of the signal potential of various risk incidents to demonstrate that risk 
management is “out of control” (such as Chernobyl in 1986, the case of BSE in the UK in 1996, or the 
Belgian Dioxin crisis in 1999). A second factor relates to the increasing availability of accessible specialist 
information (for example, via the Internet). As a consequence, public reliance on the decisions of expert 
or elite groups is no longer a tenable way to conduct risk analyses, as has been the case in the past. The 
rise of the “consumer citizen”, for example, means that societal disquiet with risk management and risk 
assessment may be expressed through consumer preference and choice in the marketplace. This may 
include increased sales of consumer goods that are produced using processing technologies of which the 
consumer approves, or which deliver a concrete and desirable consumer benefit. Such shifts in consumer 
preference may occur under circumstances where there is public concern about the development and 
commercialisation of emerging technology as has been the case with genetically modified food, and may 
occur with emerging technologies such as nanotechnology in the future.  
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Consumers may express their disquiet with risk analysis in a variety of ways. For example, consumers 
may switch to a different type of product  (Pennings, Wansink and Meulenberg, 2002). Alternatively they 
may switch to highly trusted brands that they perceive to be safe because the manufacturer has a history 
of responding responsibly with respect to consumer welfare under circumstances where there is a food 
safety problem,for example, by product recall(Chaudhuri and Holbrook, 2001).   
 
Additional communication needs may result from increased transparency in risk analysis. Public distrust 
in risk assessment is likely to arise under circumstances where uncertainties and variabilities in risk 
assessment become open to public scrutiny through increased transparency, but are not explained 
explicitly as part of the risk communication process (Frewer et al, 2002). (This may possibly be the result 
of well-intentioned institutional concerns that the public is not tolerant of, or able to even understand, 
uncertainty and variability, as only experts are able to understand these issues). However, both 
uncertainty and variability will become open to public scrutiny as a result of transparency, and proactive 
communication about both is a necessary precondition for the development of public trust.  It is important 
to ensure that different types of uncertainty are communicated, as well as risks to vulnerable groups. This 
may require targetted approaches to communication, as well as increased knowledge about how 
consumers think about uncertainty, and process incoming risk messages that include uncertainty 
information. If the public perceives that there is an attempt by the authorities or the scientific community to 
conceal the limitations of scientific knowledge regarding the risk assessment process, public distrust in 
the actors involved and the process itself will result. In the same spirit, effective communication about 
associated uncertainties is also essential if the precautionary principal is to be applied, as its application 
in itself implicitly provides external observers with a signal that there is some uncertainty associated with 
the risk assessment.  
 
In the past, expert communities have assumed that providing lay people with information about 
uncertainty would result in public negativity towards the whole process of risk analysis.  In addition, public 
distrust in science and scientific institutions would increase, and panic and confusion regarding the impact 
of a given hazard on human health and the environment result (Wynne, 1992). Expert groups have 
tended to assume that lay people cannot conceptualise uncertainty in risk assessment or risk 
management (Frewer et al, 2002). However, scientific and policy communities appear to have 
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underestimated the ability of non-experts to understand uncertainty.  In fact, there is evidence that it is the 
failure of institutional actors to communicate uncertainty that increases public distrust in institutional 
activities designed to manage risk.  
 
Communicating uncertainty information associated with the assessment decreased risk perceptions for 
those expressing high initial levels of environmental concern. It is of note, however, that a converse effect 
was found for those initially unconcerned about the potential for environmental impact.  Moreover, lay 
people do distinguish between different kinds of uncertainty (Frewer et al, 2003). For example, there is a 
lay differentiation between uncertainty associated with lack of knowledge, (for example, lack of scientific 
information regarding a specific risk, or conflicting scientific information or opinion), and uncertainty about 
the potential impact or extent of a particular hazard. Lay people also recognise that further research may 
be needed in order to reduce the uncertainty, and acknowledgement of this need may, in turn, be trust 
inducing.  Indeed, the public appears more accepting of uncertainty resulting from shortfalls in scientific 
process than to uncertainty associated with the failure of institutions to reduce scientific uncertainty 
through conducting appropriate empirical investigation. This serves to confirm the National Research 
Council recommendation (1994) that risk communication should focus on the sources of uncertainty as 
well as the magnitude of uncertainty associated with a particular hazard. 
 
Of course, other factors associated with risk assessments also influence risk management decisions (for 
example, the severity and immediacy of the potential risk, the cost and side effects of mitigation options, 
and the cost and time required for research). Uncertainty associated with risk assessments, risk 
management, and the link between risk assessment and risk management should be communicated to 
the public and other key stakeholders as well as to decision-makers if there is to be an informed public 
debate about how risks should be handled. 
 
Another risk assessment issue that must be disseminated to all interested parties, including the public, is 
that of risk variability, when the risk varies across a population but the distribution is well known. 
Vulnerable groups may be identified from this information, which merit targeted communication about 
both assessment and management processes. Understanding variability may also have implications for 
the allocation of resources to risk mitigation activities (Morgan and Henrion, 1990), which may also be a 
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focus of public debate. Discussion of how such resources are allocated is important in development of 
public confidence in risk management and, ultimately, risk assessment.  
 
At present, however, there is insufficient knowledge about how to develop best practice in risk 
communication about uncertainty and variability. The former is contingent on developing ways to discuss 
different kinds of uncertainty; the latter may entail methodological development in targeting information to 
“at risk” populations. Both risk uncertainty and risk variability have profound implications for decisions 
associated with resource allocation  (for example, how research funds are distributed across hazards in 
order to reduce uncertainties, or how risk mitigation activities are prioritised for risks which differentially 
effect different sub-populations). Public trust in these processes is likely to be low unless there is 
informed public debate regarding both risk management and risk assessment procedures, which permits 
the inclusion of wider societal values and priorities into decision-making processes.  
 
Increased transparency in the process of risk analysis, and increased emphasis on participatory 
democracy and citizen inclusion may increase citizen and consumer trust in the activities of risk 
assessors, managers and other key stakeholders. They may also increase public distrust if not 
approached in the correct way. Jasanoff (1990) has concluded that both increased transparency and 
public consultation may further undermine the credibility of government authorities, if the process of 
opening up legislative processes and increased public consultation is not considered carefully. In 
particular, asking the public what they think is likely to reduce public trust if the results of public 
consultation are not explicitly incorporated into the risk analysis process. The process of developing and 
conducting participatory exercises should be externally audited, as should the impact of participatory 
processes on the policy process itself (Rowe and Frewer, 2000; Rowe and Frewer, in press). Failure to 
take account of public views, particularly after they have been explicitly solicited, will make the process of 
participatory democracy appear more like a public relations exercise than an attempt to democratically 
reach decisions about risk assessment and management. There is a further need to examine of how to 
take account of the diversity of public opinion in policy decisions.  
 
7. Some illustrative examples of recent  “food scares”  
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With the knowledge of risk perception and the role of trust in risk communication, I will now discuss some 
of the causes for recent public food scares. 
 
BSE  - The peak of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) epidemic in the UK was reached in 
1993 when over 1000 new BSE suspect cases were reported each week. BSE subsequently spread to 
other European countries, Japan, the US and Canada. The primary driver of public concern was the 
failure of the UK government to acknowledge the uncertainty about BSE as a potentially causative agent 
of the human form of the disease, Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (nvCJD), prior to 1996. Public risk 
perception was also affected by the failure to provide information relevant to the actual concerns of 
consumers about food hazards. In the case of BSE, information based on technical risk assessments 
ignored the drivers of public concern. These included animal welfare issues, (which became focused in 
the public view as a result of media reporting and attention on animal production processes), and 
institutional denial of uncertainty associated with regulatory decisions and risk assessment (Frewer and 
Salter, 2001) 
 
Genetically modified foods – the case of genetically modified (GM) foods serves to illustrate that public 
attitudes are not dependent on an analytical assessment of risk and benefit.  Other factors, such as 
ethical and moral considerations, other values such as concern about the integrity of nature, and trust in 
the regulatory system play a part in societal and consumer acceptance (Miles and Frewer 2001; Jensen 
et al 2003). Developing communication about substantial equivalence (i.e. that the content of GM foods 
was not substantially different to conventional counterparts) did not address consumer concerns, and was 
thus not relevant to consumer fears. Research also demonstrated that control over consumption of GM 
foods was enormously important to European consumers, necessitating the labelling of GM foods and 
implementation of effective traceability systems (Miles et al, submitted). The negative public reaction to 
GM foods was therefore less to do with risk, and more to do with consumer choice and the failure to 
deliver information about what was actually driving consumer concerns. Opaque risk analysis systems 
and decision-making practices were not helpful in reassuring the public. The absence of 1st generation 
products with tangible and desirable consumer benefits did little to reassure consumers about the motives 
of the food industry in introducing these crops.  
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Dioxins –The Belgian Dioxin crisis in May-June 1999 was characterised by a public perception that the 
Belgian ministries of public health were covering up contamination of the food chain resulting from a 
dioxin contamination of animal feed (Verbeke 2001). Public negativity was characterised less by the risks 
to public health per se, but was rather more related to the belief that the authorities were not telling the 
truth about the associated risks. In part, this was due to slow response to developing a risk 
communication strategy once the problem was discovered. 
These recent examples show a few failures of communicating the relevant knowledge to the public. 
Apparently it is not so easy to determine what information has to be communicated and how that should 
be done.  
 
8. The need for integrating social and natural science in the area of food safety 
It is essential that social and natural scientists work together in order to address issues associated with 
consumers and food, in the area of safety and beyond. Issues of consumer choice encompass not only 
responses to food risk such as microbial contamination, toxicology, and consumer responses to food 
processing technologies, but also emerging concerns in the area of human health (for example, obesity or 
unhealthy food choices). Both developing improved food safety risk analysis and improving the basis for 
healthy food choices rely on adoption of a transdisciplinary perspective integrating theoretical approaches 
from both the social and natural science perspectives. Increased transparency in risk management 
means that a combined effort is needed from both risk assessors and risk communicators in identifying 
what to communicate, not only about what risks are known, but also about what risks are uncertain, and 
how they vary across populations. This may imply that it is necessary to develop communication about 
different kinds of uncertainties, at present an area which is not understood. An example might include 
distinction between outcome uncertainty (“what might actually happen and with what probability”) and 
assessment uncertainty (“to what extent are the results of the analysis likely to change with additional 
information”; Brown and Ulvilla, 1987). Assessment uncertainty is an important factor in deciding how to 
act, i.e. whether to reduce risk (through mitigation action) or reduce uncertainty (through focused 
research activity). Of course, other factors also influence this decision (e.g. the severity and immediacy of 
the potential risk, the cost and side-effects of mitigation options, and the cost and time required for 
research). Developing effective communication about these different types of uncertainty is an important 
first step in developing a mechanism for a societal discussion about how to handle risk.  
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In other words, it is essential that a structured dialogue is developed to better understand key scientific 
paradigms underlying regulatory oversight such as scientific uncertainty, absence of zero risk, and 
comparative risks associated with developments in the life sciences and food safety. Such a debate will 
facilitate the development of international guidelines, standards and recommendations, based on 
international scientific and, of course, societal consensus.  
 
Various research activities at the University of Wageningen and Research Centre are currently focusing 
on developing an integrated natural-social approach to understanding food safety. These include 
understanding what behaviours put consumers at risk from microbial contaminants in the kitchen 
environment (natural science) and the development of effective communication interventions building on 
attitude change models specifically targeting these behaviours (social science). This project is a direct 
collaboration between the social science group and RIVM (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu). 
Research in the Wageningen Allergy Consortium specifically focuses on societal acceptance of allergy 
prevention strategies (for example, with respect to food allergens, or environmental allergens such as 
Birch pollen). Other issues of potential importance, such as food intolerance, quality of life, and economic 
impact may become a focus of social-natural science collaborative research in the future. The relationship 
between consumer confidence and the process of risk analysis will also investigate food safety through 
integrating social and natural science activity, spanning various European Union countries 
(SAFEFOODS, co-ordinated by RIKILT – Institute of Food Safety) and funded by the European 
commission). This project primarily focuses on developing public confidence in the risk management 
component of risk analysis. In the future, research will need to focus on the development of public 
confidence in the risk assessment component, particularly as risk analysis becomes more transparent.   
Research funded by VWA (Voedsel en Waren Autoriteit) focuses on the analysis of the impact of 
technical food risks on consumer perceptions, confidence and behaviours. It is anticipated that the 
theoretical framework that develops can be applied to other areas of science innovation in the agri-food 
sector, such as nanotechnology or sustainable food production systems. In conclusion, future research 
must certainly take full account of the need to integrate the social and natural sciences if real problems 
associated with human health, food safety and food security are to be addressed. A good starting point 
for discussion will be the Wagenigen Integrated food – safety platform, which was initiated to facilitate 
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discussions between scientists of different disciplines regarding the implementation of effective research 
in the food safety area. Future developments may focus on the role of affect or emotion in understanding 
how consumers handle and interpret risk information, how institutions should structure themselves in 
order to accommodate both technical and societal issues to do with risk assessment, and how these new 
theoretical perspectives can be applied to emerging areas of concern. These might include health issues 
related to food choice, or other areas of technology acceptance, for example in relation to the rural 
landscape.   
 
Conclusions 
Societal responses to food risks, or emerging technologies (such as nanotechnology, for example) may 
reflect increased public distrust unless institutions and organisations act to develop and maintain public 
confidence in their risk assessment and risk management practices. While public trust is, to some extent, 
contingent on institutional transparency, other factors, such as institutional responses to public concerns, 
are also important. To this end, there has recently been increased emphasis on involving the public in risk 
management, including the development of methods to include the public in the debate about risk 
management, communication and assessment.  
 
Increased transparency in risk decision-making has made it apparent to all stakeholders that risk analysis 
is not a purely objective process as it has been previously portrayed, but is subject to value judgements. 
Risk assessment is not excluded from this conclusion. Increased transparency has also resulted in risk 
uncertainties inherent in risk assessment becoming open to public scrutiny, which will result in further 
challenges to the concept of “purity” of the objective reality in which risk assessment is currently confined. 
Participatory processes, therefore, should not only contribute to decisions about how risks are managed, 
but also how, and which, risks are assessed, in what time scale and geographical location, taking full 
account of risk variability across populations and landscapes. The latter will become more salient as 
knowledge about risk variability increases (for example, as more is known about individual susceptibilities 
to risks through advances in genomic research). Without public trust, it is unlikely that risk analysis will be 
effective, and public opposition to many institutional risk-related activities will continue. 
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Many problems related to food safety, and indeed in other areas of risk and health, can only be solved if a 
fully integrated co-operation between the social and natural sciences is developed and applied. To this 
end, it is important to develop new theoretical frameworks in order to operationalise both research ideas 
and the solution to problems, and to develop a language to facilitate collaboration between social and 
natural scientists. Only through adopting such an approach can problems in food safety be solved.  
 
Thank you.  
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